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congressional intent, for Skifter had asked whether the property would
be taxed under other sections of the code if it were not life insurance,
not whether the power held by the decedent would have been sufficient
under those sections to result in inclusion. This distinction is criti-
cal, for the former statement of the issues requires the court to examine,
in addition to the nature of the power, the source of the power, the
way in which it is held, and whether the arrangement is a substitute for
testamentary disposition of the property.
Implicit in the Lumpkin court's decision is the view that even
though life insurance is not always inherently testamentary, it has tes-
tamentary characteristics which may justify taxation in situations where
other forms of property would not be taxed. Whether this premise is
valid is open to question in view of the refusal of Congress to treat life
insurance as inherently testamentary, but even if the premise is accepted
the court did little to provide guidelines for applying it to other situa-
tions. The factors which other courts have viewed as important in de-
fining "incidents of ownership" are neither integrated into the Lump-
kin result nor rejected outright; this should allow wide latitude for
other courts to distinguish the decision.
Lumpkin is an apparent success for the contention of the Service
that powers sufficient to result in inclusion under other sections of the
Code are sufficient to constitute incidents of ownership, but it does little
to provide a workable definition of "incidents of ownership" and may
only inject more confusion into this unsettled area of the law.
STEVEN KROPELNICKI, JR.
Federal Income Tax-Internal Revenue Code Sections 167 and
263-Depreciation on Depreciation?
Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the taxpayer
a deduction from gross income for depreciation of certain property used
in his business.' Section 263 forbids the deduction of any amounts
1. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 167, provides in part:
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reason-
able allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.




paid out as capital expenditures and improvements,' although those
capital expenditures might themselves be depreciable. Amounts paid
out for such expenditures include acquisition and construction costs.3
Recently, in Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner,4 the question arose
whether construction costs to be capitalized might include depreciation
incurred on a taxpayer's equipment during the construction of its own
capital properties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held against
capitalization of construction equipment depreciation.
The taxpayer in Idaho Power was a public utility that normally
built additions to its own primary electrical transmission and distribu-
tion lines and stations. During the taxable years 1962 and 1963,
Idaho Power had charged to plant accounts all depreciation and operat-
ing expenses incurred on its equipment to the extent it was used in
construction of new lines.5 The depreciation thus capitalized on the
books totalled 280,571.41 dollars on equipment with a composite life
of ten years. On its federal tax returns the taxpayer deducted all de-
preciation incurred during these periods, including that allocated on
its books to construction. The I.R.S. disallowed a substantial por-
tion of the deduction, but did allow the depreciation to be added to the
depreciable portion of the facilities constructed and thus to be deducted
over the useful lives of the facilities, all of which were expected to last
at least thirty years.6
On appeal to the Tax Court from the deficiency, 7 Idaho Power
contended that the depreciation should be entirely deductible in the
years it was incurred since the equipment was used in its "trade or
business" within the meaning of section 167.8 The government coun-
tered that construction of power facilities was not within the scope of
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263, provides in part:
(a) General Rule.-No deductions shall be allowed for-
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent im-
provements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate.
In specific exclusions which follow, no mention is made of electric utilities. Forerun-
ner provisions are comparable.
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958).
4. 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 351 (1973) (No. 263).
5. Although on its books the taxpayer capitalized depreciation as well as main-
tenance and other equipment operating expenses, it deducted as expenses pension con-
tributions, Social Security tax, and motor vehicle tax. 477 F.2d at 690.
6. It should be noted that the mere allowance of capitalization does not neces-
sarily permit subsequent deduction (through amortization) of the particular cost. E.g.,
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960) (goodwill).
7. Idaho Power Co., 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 427 (1970).
8. Id. at 429; see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a)(1).
1974]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the taxpayer's trade or business and that even if it were, the current de-
duction of any capital expenditure in connection with trade or business
is prohibited by section 263. The Tax Court held for the Com-
missioner and focused on section 263 in requiring capitalization.
The court of appeals directed its attention to section 167 and
found the "trade or business" determination to be crucial. It reversed
the Tax Court and held that immediate deduction of this type of de-
preciation is allowable.
When the depreciation-capitalization problem had previously been
addressed, the courts had split. In 1927, the Board of Tax Appeals
decided Great Northern Railway'0 which involved depreciation of
trains and equipment already owned but used occasionally for trans-
porting employees to railway construction sites. The workers were
carried on regularly scheduled runs. The Board held that any operating
expenses, incremental or not, which could possibly be allocated to
construction must not be deducted immediately. Specifically, the court
disallowed the portion of the depreciation deduction allocable to con-
struction work. In so doing, the court held that "a part of the wear and
tear of the train equipment, of the rails, ties, etc., may be properly
capitalized.""
A few years later, the same railway brought the same question
9. 477 F.2d at 696. As to the weight accorded court of appeals decisions by
the Tax Court, compare Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), aft'd, 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir. 1971) (will follow the court of appeals for its circuit if squarely in
point), with Estate of George I. Speer, 57 T.C. 804, 812 (1972) (will not follow if
a different state is involved), and Donald W. Fausner, 55 T.C. 620, 626 (1971). Also,
the judges of the Tax Court do not bind each other by their decisions unless
they are reviewed by the court as a whole. Comment, Toward New Modes of Tax
Decision Making, 83 Htav. L. REv. 1695, 1700 n.30 (1970).
10. 8 B.T.A. 225 (1927), afrd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
855 (1930). A strong analogy can be drawn between railroads and electric companies,
and between railway tracks and power lines. Both industries are regulated, and ex-
pansion and replacement of facilities have been a major part of their businesses.
11. 8 B.T.A. at 263 (even though the Board also found the depreciation to have
been incurred in the railroad's regular business). I.R.S. disallowance of current depre-
ciation deductions was particularly onerous to railroads since they commonly used the
"retirement" method for reporting. Under this method, capitalized acquisition costs
are not depreciable over time. Only when restoration and replacement charges exceed
half the current replacement cost of the asset may the original cost be deducted from
revenues. Since the original cost contains the depreciation on equipment from the con-
struction period, recovery of that depreciation cost free of taxes was postponed drastic-
ally. 4 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.37 (rev. 1969). But
see INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 263(e) (added in 1969). Note, however, that replace-
ments (as opposed to originals) of railroad track were customarily treated as current
expenses, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 99 U.S. 402, 421 (1878).
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back to the Board of Tax Appeals.12 During 1928, 1929, and 1930;
Great Northern Railway incurred depreciation on equipment that it was
again using "in the construction of additions to or betterments of" its
property.13 As prescribed by Interstate Commerce Commission di-
rectives, the railway had added this depreciation to the cost of the as-
sets on its books, but for tax purposes it deducted all the depreciation
immediately. The Board allowed the deduction as a matter of course
once it found the equipment to have been used in a trade or busi-
ness.
14
In this second Great Northern case, the court did not explore
the section 263 capitalization problem because the government brief had
failed to cite the first Great Northern case, key precedent in support of
capitalization. 15 This omission by the Commissioner was interpreted
by the Board as an indication that the I.R.S. was abandoning its tradi-
tional position favoring capitalization. The I.R.S. had not, in fact,
abandoned that policy and referred in its brief many years later in
Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States' 6 to "the Board's mistaken
view that the Commissioner's unexplained failure to cite the first Great
Northern decision meant that he repudiated its authority."'
7
The taxpayer in Southern Natural Gas was an interstate gas car-
rier that built new pipelines to expand its system. Some of the equip-
ment that it owned primarily for maintenance and operation was
used from time to time to construct additional facilities. The Court
of Claims held that depreciation allocable to the use of the equipment in
construction was not a proper current deduction but should be capital-
ized and recovered over the lives of the new pipelines. Although the
results in Southern Natural Gas and Idaho Power are divergent, in both
cases the courts relied on the section 167 trade or business test. This
approach had been adopted by the court in Northern Pacific Railway
12. Great N. Ry., 30 B.T.A. 691 (1934) [hereinafter referred to as the second
Great Northern case].
13. Id. at 707.
14. See 477 F.2d at 694. The Board of Tax Appeals which had decided the second
Great Northern later expressly limited that holding to precisely this point, that th6
depreciation was incurred in trade or business since it is part of a railroad's regular
business to construct additional capital facilities for doing business as a common car-
rier. Producers Chem. Co., 50 T.C. 940, 960 (1968).
15. 30 B.T.A. at 708.
16. 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
17. Id. at 1268 n.78. The I.R.S. has successfully defended this position in North.
ern Pac. Ry. v. Helvering, 83 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1936); Churchill Farms, Inc., 38
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1071 (1969); Ben Perlmutter, 44 T.C. 382 (1965), aff'd, 373 F.2d
45 (10th Cir. 1967).
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v. Helvering,1 s an earlier case in which transportation expenses borne
by the railroad in constructing additions were held to be allocable to
capital items. The approved allocation formula included "wear and
tear (i.e., depreciation) of the train equipment,"'19 even though the
expenses were not incurred in pursuance of the railroad's duty as a pub-
lic carrier but as a private owner of property.2 °
No mention of "trade or business" is made in Revenue Ruling
59-38021 nor in Revenue Ruling 55-252,22 both of which require capi-
talization. Ruling 59-380 was written in response to an inquiry from
a taxpayer who used already owned and newly acquired construction
equipment for his own capital improvements. This ruling was ex-
pressly approved in Southern Natural Gas.23  Ruling 55-252 re-
quired depreciation of trucks and equipment used in reforestation to
be capitalized in the cost of the trees and recovered tax-free through
depletion allowances. Neither of these rulings has been rescinded by
the Commissioner. 4
There are limits, however, to the government's favor of capitali-
zation.25  The 1970 reversal of L.W. Brooks, Jr.26 by the Fifth Cir-
18. 83 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1936).
19. Id. at 513, quoted and clarified in Southern Natural Gas v. United States,
412 F.2d 1222, 1267 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
20. 83 F.2d at 514. The distinction drawn here between actions within and with-
out the role of common carrier for tax purposes was based upon the same distinction
as drawn in Santa Fe P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177 (1913)
for tort and contract liability purposes.
21. 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 87:
Depreciation sustained on construction equipment owned by a taxpayer and
used in the erection of capital improvements for its own use is not an allow-
able deduction, but shall be added to and made a part of the cost of the im-
provements. So much thereof as is applicable to the cost of depreciable capital
improvements is recoverable through deductions for depreciation over the
useful life of such capital improvements.
22. 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 319.
23. 412 F.2d at 1268. The Idaho Power court rejects the ruling, however, basing
its rejection on (1) its perceived invalidity of Southern Natural Gas, and (2) its lim-
ited regard for revenue rulings. 477 F.2d at 696 & n.10. As to the second point,
see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947); Stubbs v. United States, 445
F.2d 1142, 114647 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Overbey v. United States, 44 F.2d 268 (Ct.
Cl. 1930); Arthur H. Lamborn, 13 B.T.A. 177 (1928). But see 1 J. MMnTENS, supra
note 11, at § 3.20: "If, however, a ruling reflects a position not departed from by
the Treasury Department over a period of many years, it is entitled to serious consid-
eration by the courts."
24. Rev. Rul. 69-228, 1969-1 CuM. BuLL. 29, cites Rev. Rul. 59-380 as still in
force. Rev. Rul. 55-252 has not been rescinded to date.
25. Although not a limitation, note that the Commissioner will not allow capital-
ization of construction depreciation for investment credit purposes when the additions
are new section 38 property. "New section 38 property" is depreciable tangible prop-
erty (other than buildings) with a useful life of three years or more which is completed
after Dec. 31, 1961. [Nr. REv. COD OF 1954, § 48(b).
26. 50 T.C. 927 (1968), rev'd, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970).
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cuit indicates that when depreciation and other expenses are incurred
in recovering minerals, capitalization or deduction of those expendi-
tures may hinge on the type of "estate" involved.17  Customarily, oil
leases are divided into the financing interest and the operating interest.
The lease owner sells to the operator a "working interest" in the
land in return for the operator's promise to pay the owner a set amount
out of the oil produced, if any, during the early stages of production.
Risk is thus borne by both parties. If expenses of operation, such as
depreciation, are added to the basis of the oil in the ground in which
the production payment owner has an interest, he would enjoy a tax
advantage upon the sale of that oil. If, on the other hand, such ex-
penses are deducted by the operator, he would reap the tax benefits.
Capitalization might be proper only to the extent the expenditures
add to the estate of the production payment owner. Normally, how-
ever, these expenditures in raising oil add nothing to the interest itself
but merely accelerate payment. Although the operator's costs of rais-
ing oil that is allocable to production payments can be considered
costs of acquiring the capital asset and thus properly capitalized (on
the theory that the operator has simply paid the production payment
owner's share of costs), the appellate court disallowed capitalization.
Operators may currently deduct all operating expenses, even if a net
loss results, because "the proper allocation of where the operating ex-
pense burden [and the tax benefit lie] depends on the type of legal es-
tate or interest involved128 and because a basic characteristic of a pro-
duction payment interest is its freedom from operating expenses. Such
expenses are, rather, an attribute of the working interest in the land.29
If depreciation adds to the estate, it should be capitalized even
though it might be considered an "intangible" cost. The court in
Idaho Power discussed the problem of transmuting an intangible ex-
pense into tangible property. In recent years, both gradinge ° and
dredging3l have been held to be intangible costs subject to capitaliza-
27. 424 F.2d at 122. The estates involved are the working interest and the pro-
duction payment interest. The oil in the ground is a capital asset in which the produc-
tion payment owner has an incorporeal hereditament.
28. Id.
29. Id. See also C. BREED n & A. BURTON, INCOmE TAXATION oF OIL AND GAS
PRODUCnON § 2.04 (1961).
30. Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp. v. United States, 395 F.2d 493, 494 (4th
Cir. 1968).
31. Norfolk Shipbldg. & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 222 (E.D.
Va. 1971).
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tion.8 2 Capitalization of intangible expenses as additions to the estate
has been specifically held to be proper by Revenue Ruling 72-403.11
Decided in response to a request by another electric company, this rul-
ing makes costs of acquiring easements for electrical transmission
lines depreciable and initial grading a tangible asset.
Requiring capitalization as the result of a trade or business deter-
mination (as in Southern Natural Gas) is consistent with cases that
have dealt with equipment depreciation which occurred prior to the
commencement of business. In those cases involving extractive indus-
tries, such costs have been capitalized and recovered through de-
ductions for depletion. 4 In Idaho Power the new assets had not been
put into revenue-producing business at the time equipment deprecia-
tion was incurred. Thus, a portion of its business had not been com-
menced, and capitalization was appropriate so that costs could be
matched against revenue which only arose later.
The taxpayer in Idaho Power did not rely wholly on a trade or
business determination, however. It pointed to the words "paid out"
in section 26335 and contended that depreciation is not a payment
and thus cannot be capitalized."' The court pursued interpretations
of these words in other Code sections. Although depreciation has been
held to be a "payment" for charitable contribution purposes," it is not
a "payment within the taxable year"38 and is thus not deductible.
The Regulations themselves address the point obliquely. When
otherwise ordinary and necessary business expenses are "paid or in-
curred"9 to construct capital items, they themselves are capital items.
To add to the confusion, the taxpayer in Idaho Power was sufficiently
enamored of the paid-out notion to concede, contrary to its own in-
32. If the costs are "inextricably associated" with the land they may not be de-
preciated. Algernon Blair, Inc., 29 T.C. 1205, 1221 (1958).
33. 1972 1NT. REV. BuLL. No. 34, at 9-10.
34. Producers Chem. Co., 50 T.C. 940 (1968), following New Quincy Mining
Co., 36 B.T.A. 376 (1937). The depreciation sustained prior to beginning active prod-
uction, since not attributable to regular on-going business, was held capitalizable as
a development cost to be recovered in deductions for depletion and was not a statutory
net loss.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. 477 F.2d at 694.
37. Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1965); cf. Rogers v. Com-
missioner, 281 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1960).
38. Maurice S. Gordon, 37 T.C. 986-87 (1962) (involving section 213, Medical
Deductions). Note that section 213 requires capitalization of certain medical expenses
to the extent they add value to the taxpayer's property.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (1965) (emphasis added).
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terests (and contrary to common accounting practice),40 that even
small tools paid for immediately, but which had lives of less than one
year, should be capitalized in the year of purchase when used for cap-
ital construction.
41
Although depreciation is not specifically included in. the capital-
ization rule, it is not specifically exempted from the "no deduction"
rule as are certain other provisions of the Code.42  Nor is section 167
found among those sections singled out by the Regulations for tax-
payers' election to deduct or capitalize.43  By contrast, research and de-
velopment expenses are allowable as an immediate deduction even if
incurred in construction of capital assets.44  The inescapable conclu-
sion from the plain statutory words is that depreciation expense which
meets the criteria of section 263 is required to be capitalized.
One of Idaho Power's major contentions was not argued until
its appeal from the Tax Court. It asserted that deductions expressly
set out in the Code are somehow different from ordinary business ex-
penses (and thus not encompassed by section 263) simply by virtue of
their specific treatment.45  These special deductions include repairs
(section 162), interest (section 163), taxes (section 164), research
and experiment (section 174), and depreciation. The Tax Court in
All-Steel Equipment, Inc.46 supported this interpretation of the Code's
overall scheme and cited several cases holding that "deductions ex-
pressly granted by statute are not to be deferred even though they re-
late to inventory or capital items." 4t However, this particular argument
was rejected by the circuit court. The court said that under section
162 ordinary and necessary business repairs are not deductible im-
mediately but only when the manufactured goods, related to the re-
pairs, were sold.48 The court of appeals held that the Tax Court erred
40. See, e.g., G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOviCH, & J. W=na, INTERMDITE AccoUNT-
INo 470 (3d ed. 1972).
41. 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 430.
42. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263(a)(1).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3 (1965).
44. This is perhaps true because of the difficulties inherent in allocating the ex-
penses to various projects. There is also a policy of encouraging research which stems
from international technological competition.
45. The specific treatment is most likely due to the materiality and complexity
of those various deductions.
46. 54 T.C. 1749 (1970), rev'd, 467 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1972).
47. 54 T.C. at 1759.
48. All-Steel Equip., Inc. v. Commissioner, 467 F.2d 1184, 1186 (7th Cir. 1972).
Seeming almost to foresee Idaho Power, the Tax Court had pointed out that the prob-
lem of cost allocation for capital assets is indistinguishable from allocation to inven-
tory. 54 T.C. at 1759.
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in concluding that special treatment of certain expenses in the Code
dictates special timing too, and it required repairs to be allocated to
inventory.49
Income tax Regulations also directly address this problem of which
costs are properly a part of inventory. The Regulations require that
in valuing inventory the taxpayer "shall conform as nearly as may be
to the best accounting practice in the trade or business."' 0 The Amer-
ican Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the recognized au-
thority on accounting, advises that depreciation related to manufactur-
ing is to be considered in the inventory computation. 1  It is ap-
propriate under the Regulations for the taxpayer to allocate indirect
costs (such as depreciation) to inventory for tax purposes in the same
manner as he does on his books 52 when the inventory costs include
the indirect costs necessarily incident to production."8
Finally, the court in Northern Pacific Railway v. Helvering," a
case factually similar to Idaho Power, stated that each unit of service
as well as each unit of production must carry its proper proportion of
all expenses."5 This line of reasoning seems not only to justify but to
require capitalization of construction depreciation even for service
companies, so that expenses can properly be matched against revenue
accruing from use of the asset constructed.
Section 446 of the Code requires that taxable income be com-
puted by the same method of accounting as "book" income. Although
the term "method of accounting" is broad in meaning, it does include
the accounting treatment prescribed for depreciation."0 Best tax and
accounting treatment calls for clear presentation of income. This re-
quires expenses to be matched against revenues by cause-and-effect or,
failing that, by systematic rational allocation. Only if neither of these
methods can be applied should expenses such as depreciation be simply
charged off in periods in which incurred.
7
49. 467 F.2d at 1186. See also 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4851; cf.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 174(b).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(a)(1) (1958).
51. AMERICAN INSTrrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACcOUNTANTS, AccOUNTiN0 PRIN-
cIPL s BOARD STATEMENT No. 4, f 159 (1970); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC AccouNTANTs. ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY BULLETIN No. 4, 1 2 (1957).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1970).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(c) (1958).
54. 83 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1936).
55. Id. at 510. But see Rev. Rul. 141, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 101.
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (1970).
57. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING P.IN-
ciPLES BOARD STATEMENT No. 4, 161 (1970).
692 [Vol. 52
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Immediate write-off of indirect production costs has an effect sim-
ilar to accelerated depreciation methods: both postpone taxes. For
growing utilities and other enterprises, this amounts to a permanent ex-
emption. Nevertheless, accelerated depreciation allowances, additional
first year depreciation, and investment tax credits are all evidence of
the same congressional policy to allow current reduction of tax bur-
dens by immediate deduction of construction depreciation. 58 The pur-
pose of that policy is to free working capital in the economy for invest-
ment and thereby sufficiently raise aggregate taxable income in the long
run so that no net tax revenue loss results for the government. 59
Were Idaho Power to be followed generally in states which allow
a "fair return" to utilities on the "fair value" of their assets, rates
would undoubtedly be affected. Depreciation incurred in constructing
electrical facilities is of considerable magnitude. If depreciation were
to be capitalized the rate base would be inflated; if it is deducted im-
mediately asset costs remain lower.60 When depreciation is capitalized
for rate purposes and deducted on tax returns, as in Idaho Power,
rates become higher for present customers but more working capital is
available for utility service expansion.
In its apparent adherence to congressional expansionary policy,
the court in Idaho Power exercised liberality in construing the appli-
cable statutes and regulations. Perhaps it realized that the usual narrow
judicial scrutiny given deductions should not be invoked when private
businesses perform what would otherwise entail public expense.61
Idaho Power, then, seems most readily justifiable as policy in
action. It is contrary to expressed opinions of the I.R.S. and would
surely have been resolved differently if the court had adhered to the
plain meaning of the Code and Regulations. Indeed, reasoning by
analogy from the Code would mandate a different result. For example,
a contractor who constructs assets for others instead of himself and who
uses the completed contract method of recognizing income is required
to defer depreciation incurred during construction and to deduct it all in
58. 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048: "For all segments of the Ameri-
can economy, liberalized depreciation policies should assist modernization and expan-
sion of industrial capacity, with resulting economic growth, increased production, and
a higher standard of living."
59. Id. at 4050.
60. In North Carolina, rates are computed by the Utilities Commission which
considers, among other things, the original cost of property less accumulated deprecia-
tion. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133(b)(1) (1965).
61. 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 11, § 3.07, at 17.
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the year of completion. 2 This matches expense against revenue as re-
quired by sound accounting and tax principles. Proper matching in the
Idaho Power situation would require all non-revenue producing costs in-
curred during construction to be deferred for later matching against reve-
nue arising from use of the revenue producing capital asset itself.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems to have at-
tempted to justify a policy decision on non-policy grounds, with lim-
ited success. Even the implicit policy of economic expansion and in-
vestment, although applicable during the taxable years in question, is
painfully pass6 in these days of inflation and congressional tightening
of investment incentives. For its expressed rationale the court relied
heavily upon the second Great Northern case, a discredited case which
had been decided on a misunderstanding. The "trade or business"
test applied is a section 167 rule that has been artifically grafted onto
section 263 by several courts. It is a factual test, but its ill-defined
application to the facts in Idaho Power affords little guidance to other
taxpayers, even those residing in the Ninth Circuit. If Idaho Power's
construction of its own power lines were not related to a business, no
recovery of equipment cost should have been allowed at all.68 If it
were a regular business activity, then depreciation allowed should have
been allocated against the revenue to be produced by the new assets,
which were themselves most certainly used in the regular business.
The case was decided with a singular disregard for explicit rul-
ings, sound cases, and statutory law. The record indicates that the
Commissioner has consistently favored capitalization. The Internal
Revenue Code states explicitly that provisions of Title 26 Part VI al-
lowing deductions such as those in section 167 for depreciation are sub-
ject to Part IX exceptions, one of which is section 263.4 It seems that
"trade or business" can properly serve only as a threshold test for de-
termining whether an item is of a depreciable nature. All considera-
tion of capitalization must center in section 263 alone.
RAEMON M. POLK
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957); 2 J. MERTENS, supra note 11, at § 12.130.
63. Contra, International Trading Co., 57 T.C. 455 (1971), rev'd and remanded,
484 F.2d 707 (1973). It was held that a corporation may deduct a loss realized on
the sale of property which was neither used in the corporation's business nor held for
the production of income.
64. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 161.
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